ZK/SEC Research notes from zkSecurity
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Proof is in the Pudding · Part 10 of 11

Archetype x zkSecurity - Proof is in the Pudding: Groth16

ZK/SEC July 23, 2026 2 min educative · zk · groth16

For the 10th session of Proof is in the Pudding, we tackled Groth16. It's nearly ten years old and still one of the most widely used proof systems out there: 128-byte proofs, constant-size verification, deployments everywhere.

Tip

Prefer reading? This session is the video companion to Groth16, Intuitively, the written version with all the equations spelled out. Pick whichever format you prefer, or use both.

We started with why Groth16 is still used and the downsides that come with it, then recapped the arithmetization and turned a pile of R1CS constraints into a single polynomial identity, with vanishing polynomials and the Schwartz-Zippel lemma explaining why checking at one random point is enough. From there we looked at why the protocol needs pairings (you have to multiply two hidden commitments, and nothing else will do it), how random linear combinations stop the prover from using a different witness in each place, and how the CRS acts as a set of Lego pieces where the separating factors gamma and delta restrict which pieces can be snapped together. We finished by enforcing the quotient polynomial, merging the separate checks into the final equation, and enforcing public inputs.

If you enjoy this video, check out our previous episodes:

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